New England experienced a significant economic transformation after the American Revolution. It is widely believed that financial markets and the spread of banks were essential in launching American economic development. However, little is known about the precise role of banks and credit markets in the process. This paper exploits a unique dataset from bank and court records of Plymouth County, Massachusetts. My results show that the first bank at its early stage was in fact more selective in lending than the pre-existing personal credit market.
Introduction
Financial markets have long been considered crucial for economic growth. Empirical research such as King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998) establishes a positive relationship between credit market development and economic growth. The development of United States seems congruent with this view: Sylla (2002) argues that a sophisticated banking system emerged during the 1790s, and Rousseaux and Sylla (2005) suggest that financial development drove economic progress in the nineteenth century.
Upon closer examination, however, the underpinnings of this interpretation are not yet clear. In the early national period, state legislatures tightly controlled the number of bank charters. States thus had an incentive to protect local monopoly rents by restricting entry.
Because little is known about the behavior and practices of the first banks, one cannot be sure whether they really advanced the overall quality of the credit market, relative to the personal credit market that long pre-dated American independence. This paper investigates the impact of early banks using a newly developed dataset drawn from court and bank discount records of Plymouth County, Massachusetts. These detailed records allow one to compare bank lending practices before and after a major change in entry policy: before 1828, many banks remained local monopolies; however, the democratic atmosphere of the Jacksonian era fostered freer entry. The resulting change in the competitive environment provides an opportunity for examining the effect of competition on bank credit access for small farmers and artisans. Beyond narrow economic issues, the results bear on broader hypotheses about the linkage between political democracy and economic development.
Among all regions in nineteenth century America, New England was the most remarkable case of economic development. On the eve of the Revolution New England had the lowest per capita wealth among American colonies. Yet by 1840 its income per capita was 30% higher than the South.
1 Economic development in early 19 th century New
England was not merely the result of exogenous changes in industrial technology, but represented a much broader transformation of institutions and behavior.
2 1 Rothenberg (2000) 2 In addition to industrialization, New England also experienced rapid productivity growth in agriculture, as in Rothenberg (1992) .
It is widely believed that the path for capital market development is to move away from personal towards impersonal lending. As individuals are open to a broader set of potential lenders, they are able to pursue a wider range of opportunities. Rothenberg (1992) shows that local credit markets existed in the colonial era, long before the first banks were established in the United States. The multiple, interwoven credit relationships formed intricate networks. Over time these networks expanded both in depth and in width-the numbers of transactions increased and the relationships extended farther away. Moreover, interest charging also became more pervasive-a sign of market-type behavior. These findings suggest that there was no lack of a credit market. The personal credit network, centered around local merchants and moneylenders, was prevalent long before the Revolutionary war. Small farmers and artisans borrowed extensively from merchants and among themselves.
After the Revolution, banks began to surface. However, the emergence of early banks may not signify progress towards impersonal exchange. Previous literature has established the personal nature of early banking activities. Lamoreaux (1994) found that 19 th century New England banks took advantage of kinship ties to overcome the problem of asymmetric information. Big businesses and industrialists chartered banks in order to lend to themselves. Maurer and Haber (2004) examine related lending in Mexico around the turn of the 20 th century. They discovered that the recipient of related loans performed at least as well as their competitors. In both cases, related lending was a means of overcoming the poor quality of information.
Early nineteenth century saw the co-existence of banks and personal credit markets. However, we know very little about the interaction between the two. This is especially interesting in New England, as Lamoreaux (1994) shows that the insider lending was prevalent in this region. Thus the insider-lending banks and their impact on farmers and artisans are intriguing. Combining bank discount records, court records, and federal censuses of 1820, 1840, 1850, I am able to identify the occupations of borrowers from the bank and track its distribution over time. The information enables us to investigate the interaction between the bank and the personal market. Subsequently, the advent of de facto free banking in Massachusetts as of the 1820s also allows me to analyze the impact of entry on credit access to groups other than wealthy merchants.
My results confirm that long before the appearance of Plymouth Bank in 1803, a personal credit market existed in Plymouth County. Farmers and artisans relied heavily on personal borrowing. Between 1803 and 1833, the Bank used existing personal networks in extending credit; its initial stockholders were deeply involved in the local credit market long before the bank. Moreover, much of the bank's loans went to these stockholders. Occupation-wise, the bank extended credit mostly to merchants. Other major groups, such as farmers and artisans, still borrowed in the personal market. In general the bank served a very select group of clients, maintaining ongoing relationships with them. This forms a sharp contrast to the personal credit market, where farmers, and later artisans, were the major borrowers. Geographically, the bank lent mostly to residents of the county; within the county, its borrowers spread out across different townships. Thus the bank was indeed a local monopoly.
Thus in its first thirty years, the bank was the credit source for well-established merchants and the wealthy. Its discount practice was similar to the insider-lending story of Lamoreaux (1994) , but without the links to dynamic industrial firms. By the 1840's, this pattern had changed dramatically. Artisans became the most frequent borrowers of the bank. The gap between lending profiles of the bank and that of the personal credit markets narrowed. Even farmers, a group in relative decline, received more bank credit than in the monopoly period. What caused this change? My contention is that the primary factor was intensified competition between banks. In Plymouth County, a new entrant located in the same town was able to take away part of the clientele of Plymouth Bank.
The free-entry policy of the Jacksonian Era prompted the expansion of the market, as the force of competition drove banks to reach out for new potential borrowers. The rise of banking competition in Plymouth County was a reflection of the anti-monopoly sentiment in Jacksonian era. Thus political democratization, by opening entry and thus fostering competition, also enhanced economic democratization by broadening access to credit.
Institutional Context of Early Banks: the Case of Massachusetts
In the colonial period, merchants usually relied on British bankers for credit. Local stores and merchants engaged in both importing and exporting. The local farmers purchased imported goods on credit from the merchants. The merchants, in turn, imported the goods on credit from British merchant. Thus local merchants were intermediaries of credit. The local buyers of goods were the ultimate debtors, and the London merchants were the ultimate creditors. Wright (2001) argues that the revolutionary war changed this credit structure. The war interrupted credit flows, at least temporarily, into the United States.
This changed the role of American merchants in the credit market. They were no longer just the pure intermediaries; in order to conduct business, they had to seek new financing sources.
Merchants founded most early banks. Individual merchants, no matter how successful, could only extend a limited amount of credit without their own credit source.
In the colonial period, British banker provided the credit services. Pennsylvania took a short lead in the number of banks after the "Omnibus Act" of 1814. However, the number of banks stayed roughly the same for the next 20 years. 4 Bodenhorn (2000) banks was not that common among Massachusetts's towns and cities. In the same year, only 7 townships had multiple banks. 5 Overall, the growth of banks at the state level penetrated into towns gradually; it was not uncommon for a county to have only one bank throughout the 1820's.
The Banking Business and Regulation in the Early 19 th Century
In the first half of 19 th century, two sets of laws governed banking operation in Massachusetts: private laws and general laws. The General Court, Massachusetts's legislature, was in charge of both. The former applied to individual banks. Its rules only targeted the specific bank mentioned in the bill, whereas the latter applied to all banks in Massachusetts. The most common private laws on banks were charters, which was a comprehensive set of rules for the bank. In addition, any changes in the charter also required the passing of a special law. Such examples include an increase or decrease in capital stock, extension to pay in capital, renaming the bank, and closing the bank.
General laws applied to every bank in the State, and usually regulated a certain aspect of banking. Despite the distinction between private and general laws, their contents converged over time. Before 1828, all the acts on banks governed a specific aspect of banking, such as bill issuance or returns to the Governor. The charters, as mentioned above, would also incorporate new regulations from the general laws. Both of these kinds of regulation evolved over time, gradually changing the banking practices.
However, up until 1828, there was no one complete set of rules that applied to every bank in the Commonwealth.
The first step in establishing a bank was to petition for a charter. The legislature had the right to decide whether to grant a charter or not. After a bank was incorporated, it could begin to raise capital by selling stocks. Stockholders then elected the directors of the bank. The president was in turn elected by and among the directors. The directors also appointed a cashier to handle the daily operations of the bank.
Most of the loans came in the form of discounts. The banks were usually open for discount only once a week. The cashier would gather all the discount applications and submit them to the discount committee. The discount committee then decided whether to grant the discount or not. Most discounts fall into two categories: accommodation paper or commercial paper. The former was virtually a direct loan to the promissor of the note.
The note itself was similar to a personal IOU. Borrowers presented a note drawn by him and the bank accepted it. The note was the asset of the bank, just like a loan in modern days. The commercial paper, on the other hand, was passed into the holder's hands through a specific commercial transaction, backed by real goods in the trade. The predominant commercial paper was the bill of exchange. When a note or bill of exchange was discounted, the banks issued the bank notes as payment. The "discount" means that the interest was deducted before due. At the interest rate of 6%, a $100, 60-day note would generate $99 from the banks. After the notes were due, the presenter of the discount could either pay up the amount owed or try to renew it.
Throughout the period, several features of bank laws deserve attention. First, the 6% usury law was repealed only in 1867, 6 meaning the usury law was in effect throughout the first half of the 19 th century. Second, the Act of 1828 strengthened the control on bank practices in terms of risk and capital adequacy. Third, the requirement to lend to agricultural and manufacturing interest disappeared in 1828. Fourth, despite the relative low threshold for chartering banks, Massachusetts was a latecomer in freebanking laws. 7 The 1851 "free banking" act established a clear set of rules for the entry.
Any group of people who met the requirement of the act could start a bank. Moreover, instead of both charter and general statutes, the latter became the only source of banking laws. When Massachusetts officially moved into the era of free banking, de facto free banking had long been achieved. Thus some scholars, such as Wallis (2005) , argue that the real effect of the free banking act on bank entry was minimal.
Debt Collection Mechanism
Since colonial times, the Court was the major means of debt collection. In 1832, the General Court passed a law approving the concept of the chattel mortgage. This means that personal property could be used as a collateral. To some extent, any debt was always backed by real and personal property ex post. However, it only occurs after the default and debt litigation. Mortgage, however, allowed the creditor 8 Khan (2005) found that in Maine territory, by the first decade of the 18 th century, 90% of the debt cases involved debt litigation. 9 The law dated back to 1638, and was applied to private credit relationship as early as 1739. The earlier law required that the debtors be imprisoned at their own expenses until all debt was paid off. In late 17 th century, the creditors became liable to the jail fees. Generally speaking, over the early 18 th century, there were constant policy changes on relief of poor debtors. Despite such oscillations of early 18 th century, Massachusetts was moving towards more debtor relief and away from imprisonment. The formal abolishment of debtor's prison in Massachusetts was not due until the middle of the 19 th century. Nevertheless, this does not mean that imprisonment was prevalent or even used at all before the abolishment. Even in late 18th century, compared with the number of debt cases, the number of cases involving imprisonment was never really high, and it has declined over the first twenty years of the 19 th century. Moreover, the changes in statutes came after the trend in enforcement. That is, in reality, the laws of debtor's prison were not strictly enforced by 1820. For a complete discussion, see Coleman (1974) 10 In practice, when the property had to be seized, three officials were appointed to determine the value of the property. After paying back the creditor, the remains, if any, would go back to the debtor. The major change came in 1784. The 1784 statutes stated that the property would have to be sold publicly by the court instead. After paying back the debt and deducting the fee to the sheriff, the remainder of the proceeds from the auction would go back to the debtor. A case in 1821 (Sykes vs. Sever) involved the sale of stocks to pay back the debt. The stock was sold and debt cleared within a month. The swift sale and the formalized writ indicate that such procedures were routines to claim specific property after default without going through the litigation process. In Massachusetts, a chattel mortgage would require registration with the town clerk. The mortgagee must retain the property during the period of mortgage. Potentially, chattel mortgage could improve access to credit for farmers because it offered an opportunity to borrow backed by assets other than land.
The Plymouth Bank was involved in relatively few debt cases in the Plymouth Court Records. There were only 5 cases in the sample of court records between 1803 and 1850 where the Plymouth Bank brought its debtor to court. There is no information on the total amount of personal lending and borrowing in Plymouth County. It is therefore impossible to compare the default rate between bank credit and personal credit. However, the Plymouth Court Records showed that 133 individuals had more than 5 cases as the plaintiff after the bank opened. For example, one of the petitioners to acquiring the charter for the bank, Kilborn Whitman, had 32 cases after 1803. The low number of debt cases again implies that Plymouth Bank was careful in extending credits. This is consistent with the observation that the Bank lent to a very selective group of borrowers. Massachusetts as a whole; thus Plymouth County was by no means an outlier in its economic profiles. This diversity in occupation distribution allows us to examine credit market behavior both within and among different groups. Moreover, there was only one bank in Plymouth County until 1828, which was also common among non-urban areas.
Thus Plymouth County offers a unique opportunity in investigating the role of banks in a less urban setting with a variety of economic activities.
Data Sources
Various records from Plymouth County, Massachusetts provide a rare opportunity to examine various credit market issues in the early 19 th century. The main data sources are Plymouth Bank Records and Plymouth Court Records, along with 1820, 1840 and 1850 federal censuses. The detailed data allows a closer look at banks and their impact on the local credit market at the grass-root level.
The first major source of data is the records from Plymouth Bank. These records started at the very beginning of the bank in 1803. The discount records exist for years between 1803 and 1833, and then from 1844 to 1849. Among all records, the discount books provide the most detailed information on the lending practice of bank. Early banks used the approach of discounts as the primary way to extend credits. The presenter brings a note, usually either a promissory note or a bill of exchange, to the bank. The bank then discounts the note and gives the presenter the net amount due in the form of bank notes.
The Plymouth Bank was open for discounts once a week between 1804 and 1833. In the same period, all discounts were at 6% interest rate with no exception. This is in accordance with the interest ceiling imposed by the Commonwealth. Most of the discounts were 60-day notes; however, they were due in approximately 56 days, or 8
weeks after the discount. The discount for each note was still calculated for the 60-day period. This small difference adds up to about a month after six renewals. That is, the interest rate is 6% for 11 months rather than a year. This seemed to be a general practice as it applied to every discount.
On the early discount books, there could be as many as four names for each entry:
the promisor, the payee, the second endorser, and the presenter of the note for discount.
The format was designed to fit the format of commercial paper. However, accommodation paper also used the same format in the records. The amount presented for discount, the actual amount paid, and whether the debt was paid off was also recorded in the books. 
Occupations and Social Status
In both the court records and the censuses, some form of social class or occupation was recorded. In the court records, the common categories were esquire, gentleman, yeoman, merchant (trader), attorney, cordwainer, and housewright. "Yeoman" appeared in the records most often. The yeomen class referred to freeman with land holdings. The term "yeomen", despite the possibility that some may have other pursuits on the side, in general means farmers. The census data also indicate that farmer was the most common occupation in Plymouth County. Therefore it is no wonder that yeoman appeared often in the court records. Another class of farmers, husbandmen, means farmers without land. The distinction between the two is important when considering credit markets: husbandmen did not have land as implicit collateral in case of default.
They had no real property to be seized.
Gentleman and Esquire were honorary titles, given to people with more wealth.
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Esquire may also mean people affiliated with the legal profession, usually those who 11 Main (1965) In addition to the yeomen, gentlemen and esquires, there were also other professions that were recorded more precisely. One major class was merchants and traders. Another major category is the learned professions, including physicians and attorneys. These professional in general were also wealthier. The artisans, such as cordwainer, carpenter, housewright, tailor, and tanner, also constituted a significant portion of the population. Note that the category of artisan refers to individuals engaging in small-scale production, as opposed to manufacturer, which belonged to a distinct category.
Since Gentleman and Esquire are honorary titles, it could be difficult to tell their true occupations. To further analyze the occupational composition of borrowers from banks, one needs to know the exact occupations of gentlemen and esquires. Unfortunately no direct evidence for the period prior to 1850 exists, except for the three censuses. 
Analysis of Discount Records

Initial Stockholders
The first step in investigating the relationship between Plymouth Bank and the local credit market is to look at the stockholders' profiles. Plymouth Bank was the only bank in the county at the time it was chartered; interestingly, its stockholders spread out over the county. As Plymouth was the major town in the county, over half of the stockholders resided in Plymouth. It is also worth noting that two merchants from Boston were among the stockholders. Their names also appeared in Plymouth Court Records before 1803, suggesting that they had an ongoing business relationship in the county before the Bank. The discount records showed that they had a few large discounts between 1803 and 1812, and they did not hold any share after 1812, when the bank was re-chartered. On the other hand, these observations do not generalize to all stockholders outside the township of Plymouth. Some of the out-of-town stockholders never appeared in the court records, nor did they engage in any activity with the bank. The occupation composition of these stockholders was also diverse, including farmers, merchants, physician and attorneys. This suggests that there were some pure investors in the bank.
The Court Records also enables us to figure out the occupation of stockholders.
Out of the initial 73 stockholders, 63 of them could be identified by their occupation, either from the census or the court records. Table 3 tabulates the occupation of the identified stockholders and the shares under each occupation or social status. The stockholders consisted of mostly merchants, gentlemen and esquires. Among them, merchants constituted a great portion of stockholders. They held more than 55% of the stocks among those identifiable stockholders.
The most interesting observation, however, lies in the involvement of stockholders in personal credit markets. 43 out of 73 initial stockholders were plaintiffs in debt litigation before 1803; among those stockholders, eight were involved in more than 10 cases as plaintiffs. This shows that those stockholders were already deeply involved in the local credit market well before the bank started--they have lent extensively in the local market. Of all the cases involving the stockholders as plaintiffs, 35% of the defendants were farmers (yeoman). This number, as seen in Table 4 , could potentially go up since some gentlemen could be wealthy farmers. Even at the bare minimum of 35%, this still constitute the largest fraction of these cases. On the other hand, only 27 cases before 1803 involved a total of 14 stockholders as defendant. Therefore, most of the stockholders at the beginning of the bank were lenders to the local community. The last column of Table 4 Table 6 gives the distribution of discounts by occupation. As mentioned earlier, it is crucial to make the distinction between new discounts and renewals because if a note was renewed a large number of times, the same discount would appear in the records about every sixty days. Therefore their significance could be inflated. However, whether new discount or renewal, merchants were by far the major debtors to banks between 1804 and 1833. Over 50% of all discounts in the sample were to merchants. If combined with the new discounts to gentlemen and esquires, this number increases to over 85%. This again shows that the bank was serving mainly the economically well-off classes.
Moreover, Figure 4 demonstrates the number of discounts by year. period, only 32 of these merchants received discounts from the bank. On the other hand, most frequent borrowers from the bank were also frequent lenders in the personal market.
Thus the Bank indeed extended credit only to a very selected group of borrowers. Even within the merchant class, the bank still lent very selectively.
It is not surprising that the bank had such ability to differentiate good borrowers from bad ones. The directors of banks were either lawyers or big merchants. They had the social ties and relationships with locals. Either profession would possess a large amount of information about the potential borrowers, either through commercial transactions or litigations. Therefore, as in Wright (2002), banks usually had the ability to evaluate a potential borrower's credit-worthiness. Table 7 lists the occupation distribution of the two records in the same period.
Note that in the period under inspection, very few cases involved any bank, again evidence for the prudent discounting policy. Therefore bank discounts and transactions represented in court cases had very little overlap. The figures indicate that a significant difference between the composition of borrower from the bank and that in the court cases. If no specific group was more likely to bring disputes into court, the data translates into a major distinction in bank credit and personal credit. Namely, farmers and artisans did not have easy access to banks. They usually borrowed on the local credit market.
Their presence in the court records shows that they did have demand for credit; however their demand was not met by the Plymouth Bank during this period.
The simple comparison above, however, needs further examination. One may argue that merchants usually engage in frequent and repeated transactions with each other. Hence the court was only one of the possible resorts of conflict resolution.
Reputations could have played a key role. Thus a low percentage of merchant defendants does not mean that there was a small number of merchants borrowing from other 15 The number here is a rough estimate. This is because a lot of cases had multiple plaintiffs.
individuals. It could simply mean that they either had a lower default rate because of the reputation mechanism at play, or there were other means of conflict resolution. Both factors could contribute to the low percentage of merchants as defendants.
In a local economy, farmers and artisans, not just merchants, also had repeated contacts with other potential lenders or borrowers. It was true that merchants had close relationships in business; farmers, however, also maintained close relationships with local merchants since the latter provided them credit and outlets for agricultural output.
16
Therefore the use of social ties or even just the threat of losing future business was not restricted to merchants. Thus one cannot be sure that merchants are less likely to default.
Moreover, merchants were the largest group of plaintiffs, making up more than 24 percent in all litigations. In fact, using the same Court Records, Nelson (1981) found that the commercial center in the county, the Town of Plymouth, had a much higher rate of litigation. Moreover, these intra-town suits were brought about by a small group of "litigious" individuals, usually merchants. This suggests that merchants may be more prone to litigations. The evidence is not definitive: since merchants were likely to engage in many more credit transactions, it is possible that they resolved a portion of their debt disputes by other means.
Another possible explanation is the discrepancy in geographical representation of bank records and court records. Simply put, the bank lent mostly to individuals in the town of Plymouth, which, as a commercial center, had more merchants than other regions. The court records, on the other hand, represent the defaults of the whole county.
If this is the sole explanation, once we restrict the samples to the town of Plymouth, the gap should vanish. The result, however, shows otherwise. If we look at only the town of Plymouth, about 70% of the bank's discount went to the merchants. In the court records, about 8.5% of the defendants were merchants, with farmers and artisans making up 20.7% and 21.7%, respectively. Even if one considers all the gentlemen to be merchants, this would still only account for 31% of the cases. Thus the gap still exists.
The difference presented in Table 7 is indeed striking. Farmers had very limited presence in the discount records of the Bank-only slightly more than 8%. The number is fairly close to the stipulated 10% for agricultural and manufacture loans in the charter.
16 Bidwell and Falconner (1925) The fact that such statute appeared in the charter also reflects the reluctance of contemporary banks to extend credit to people other than the economically well-off class.
These pieces of evidence demonstrate that there was indeed a discrepancy in borrowers between bank and personal credit.
Discount Amounts
Up to this point, we have some basic information on the discount practices of the Plymouth Bank. The bank discounted mainly to a selected group of merchants. The discounts were renewed frequently, meaning that a great portion of them became virtually long-term loans. Accommodation paper, rather than commercial paper, was the principal form even for merchants. This means that the credit was not based on or backed by specific transactions. Overall the Bank did not exclusively provide commercial credit for the merchant community. This rules out the possibility of specialization. In the personal credit market, the most common form of lending was in promissory notes; most of them were due on demand, which makes them virtually long-term debts. Interestcharging on promissory notes also became prevalent in early nineteenth century. The use of promissory notes was not restricted to farmers or artisans, either. Therefore, Between 1804 and 1833, the discount amounts from the Bank are much higher than the debt cases presented in the court. The mean of the former was $817.56 and the latter is $123.74. One important qualification, however, is the fact that the personal credit market and the bank had distinct clienteles. As mentioned above, the occupation distribution of the borrowers were indeed very different. Therefore it may very well be that the merchants, who borrowed from the bank a lot, simply needed larger amount of loans. This may be the driving force of such distinctions.
In order to control the selection problem of the borrower, I matched all the names that appeared in both records. The purpose is to compare the amount of both bank discounts and debt owed from the same group of people. Out of the 471 individuals in the bank's records from 1804 to 1833, 108 also showed up as defendants in the court.
Another issue is renewal in the bank records. The majority of discounts were renewals;
just comparing the average amounts may thus be misleading. Especially when the longterm debts could be paid back slowly, taking the mean may cause the initial borrowing amount to be biased downward. Therefore I restrict the sample to only new discounts. Table 8 shows the mean amounts for the same group of borrowers in the court records and bank discount books. The Bank lent out larger amounts. Equivalently, the same group of borrowers would borrow greater amount from the bank than from individual personal credit markets. Even if one compares the average amount year by year, the same results still hold. Table 9 breaks down the percentage lent to different occupation groups by quartiles of amount. Moving from small loans to large loans, the percentage of discount extended to merchants also increases accordingly. Nevertheless, even for small loans, merchants still constituted the largest group of borrowers. This once again proves that merchants were the main borrowers from the bank.
It is not surprising that banks were able to lend out greater amounts. After all, the banks gathered the financial resources of many investors. Individual moneylenders or shopkeepers, no matter how successful, only had limited financial resources to their own.
Even if they had substantial assets, they would not be willing to lent a great amount to one single borrower, for the simple cause of risks: if the borrower failed, a great portion of their wealth was in jeopardy. On the other hand, banks had a much larger pool of capital. This enabled them to diversify successfully even though the amount of each discount was large.
Unlike modern banks, deposits were not the major source of funds for early 19 th century banks. Instead, a great part of the loanable funds came from paid-in capital. In Massachusetts, banks could potentially lend up to double of their capital stock. The low level of deposits and the low leverage ratio somewhat constrained banks' capacity to extend credit. Thus even under the relative conservative banking laws of Massachusetts, banks still offered credit on a greater scale, even if only to a small group of people.
Discount Data, 1844-1849
The Changing Competition Landscape
The first half of the 19 th century saw the emergence of industry in the Northeast.
The New England area has been the herald of economic development. In the early years of the bank, most discounts went to local merchants. Over the years, textile mills sprung The early 1830's were also an era for the beginning of savings banks. The savings banks were organized for the members, who made deposits. The savings bank could invest in assets with collateral, such as, bank stocks, government bonds, and mortgages. It could also make personal loans, but only with at least two sureties and no more than half of its deposits. 17 Thus its loan activities were somewhat restricted. Savings banks also got into the mortgage market more frequent than banks, although there were also limits on how much mortgage credit it could lend out. 
Analysis of Discounts, 1844-1849
The second set of the discount records was between 1844 and 1849. There were several fundamental differences in the recording of these entries. First, between 1804 and 1833, there was only the original weekly discount date and the duration, usually 60 days.
In the records of 1845 and 1846, there was only the due date and dates of discount. The period of discount was usually 60, 120, or 180 days. From 1846 to 1849, the dates of the original notes were also recorded, and they usually differ from the date of discount. That is, there were three different dates for each entry: the date of the discount, the date of the original note, and the due date of the note. Despite that the duration still centered around 17 Overall, the investment activities were under much tighter control for savings banks. For example, the loans to banks required the backing of bank stocks at no more than 90% of its par value. 18 The limit was imposed in 1834. Mortgage assets could not exceed 75% of the total deposits of the savings bank. See Law of Massachusetts, 1834, Chapter 190, §8 60, 120 and 180 days, the distribution of actual discount periods was much more spread out. It was similar to a spectrum ranging from 6 days to 180 days, some lasted even longer than that. The information on discount renewals was incomplete. The discount books recorded whether a discount was renewed only in early 1844. Nevertheless, out of the 117 samples in early 1844, only 33 were paid in full. Most others were renewed at full amount, and relatively few were renewed in part.
Despite a change in format, the bank records seemed to put accommodation paper and commercial paper in the same entry format, as in the pervious sample period. Using the same technique in identifying commercial paper, approximately 150 entries out of the 681 discounts could be identified as commercial paper. Therefore, a majority of the discounts were still accommodation loans. It is difficult, however, to track down the exact duration of the loan, as each entry itself may have different lengths. Nevertheless, from the high renewal rate in 1844, one could infer that the discounts usually lasted longer than the duration of the note itself. Table 10 exhibits the same information as Table 7 , only for the period between 1844 and 1849. The proportion of discount to merchants has decreased while that to farmers and artisans increased. This change is especially significant. If we divide the previous period (1804-1833) into small sub-periods, the distribution was fairly stable over the first 30 years of the bank. The same is true between 1844 and 1849. Therefore the difference between the two sample periods is striking. This suggests some fundamental changes occurred in the banking environment between 1833 and 1844.
Compared with the court records in the previous period, the merchant class actually constitutes\d a higher proportion of plaintiffs. This change, unlike discount data, occurred only gradually. The proportion of merchant plaintiffs increased year by year.
Another interesting finding for this period is the change in the profiles of borrower's occupations. Table 11 shows the breakdown of discounts in frequency and amounts. Compared with Table 7 , the major change is the decrease in number of discounts to merchants. Instead artisans constituted a great number of discounts. This is especially striking as in the previous sample period, discounts to artisans consist of only 3% of all discounts. The case for farmers, however, is somewhat blurred since in the first period, there could have been wealthy farmers categorized as gentlemen or even esquires.
In order to gain a better grasp of what exactly were the gentlemen's occupations, I single out the individuals with the title of gentlemen and use the 1840 and 1850 census to figure out their occupation. In the limited sample we have, the gentlemen were predominantly merchants, with relatively few in other occupations. Of course, this does not really give us their precise occupations in the earlier period, but the result indicated that they could very well be merchants. If the pattern is true for early 19 th century, then indeed the farmers had very limited access to bank credit.
Therefore, based on the information I have, farmers and artisans had a greater share of bank credit. The merchants, as opposed to the period of 1804 and 1833, received relatively fewer discounts from the bank, even after including the gentlemen as merchant class. Once again, the distribution of the occupation was stable over the years, implying a structural change between 1833 and 1844.
Competition and Lending Patterns of Banks
Up to this point, one can conclude that the Plymouth Bank did undergo changes in lending practices over the first half of the 19 th century. Namely, they lent mostly to merchants before 1833, and after 1844, artisans became the largest borrower group. What caused this change?
One candidate would be changing economic activity. The first half of the 19 th century was the era of rapid industrialization in New England. Thus the lending patterns of banks might have simply reflected the economy in transition: the economy is shifting from commerce to small industry. In order to further understand this phenomenon, one needs to take into account the occupational breakdown of the Plymouth population. The 1840 census provided the background information for the County. Table 12 compares the census of 1820 and 1840. Clearly the twenty-year period saw an increase in manufacturing. The population in the county as a whole increase by approximately 24%, but the population engaging in manufacturing almost doubled. Thus the increase in discounting to artisans may be partially explained by the shifting occupation distribution:
despite the obvious bias towards merchants, bank discounts somewhat reflected the changing landscape of economic activities.
However, this point does not really explain the lack of bank discounts to artisans between 1804 and 1833. First, the shifts in economic sectors did not occur suddenly;
there must have been gradual changes in the composition of occupations. Therefore, if bank discounts simply reflect the economic profile of the county, one should be able to observe gradual changes. Specifically, amounts of credit extended to artisans and manufacturers between 1804 and 1833 should have increased gradually. However, this
was not the case. Despite year-to-year fluctuations, the distribution of occupations remained stable from year to year between 1804 and 1833. The proportion of discounts to merchants was at the level around 60% throughout the period. In other words, despite the shifting economic focus, the lending practice has not changed much. Moreover, the agricultural lending also casts doubts on this hypothesis. Relative to small manufacturing, the number of people working in farming increased only marginally. Yet the bank lent much more frequently to farmers in the later period, the share rising from 8% to 14%.
Therefore the shift in economic activity alone could not really explain the changes in lending.
Another possible explanation could be the regulation on banks. Two possibilities arise here: the requirement to lend to farmers and artisans and the limit on asset to capital ratio. The Plymouth Bank was required to make discounts to farmers and small manufacturers in its initial charter and later in the 1812 renewal. 19 With the sample of the bank records, it is difficult to really figure out what was the ratio of such discounts to the capital of the bank. Since such discounts usually were up for renewal only once a year, it is possible to calculation the ratio of such discounts outstanding to total discounts only if one has all discount records. Nevertheless, the rare occurrence of such one-year discounts suggests that the banks could have been operating at the minimum required level.
The regulation on the minimum level of long-term agricultural discounts vanished in the bank's 1828 charter. In fact, as the 1828 act was the basis for all subsequent charters for all banks in the state, there was no such restriction anymore. Therefore the increase in discounts to farmers could not be the result of further requirement for agricultural loans. Combined with a higher number of discounts to farmers, the relaxation of such laws suggested that loans to farmers were not really stipulated by the government.
The other regulatory factor is the limit on the ratio of "debts due to banks" to bank capital. Such ratio had been 200% for Plymouth Bank and was still in effect up to 1850.
One might argue that the bank might have reached such limit between 1804 and 1833, thus it was unable to extend credit to farmers and artisans. Petition for increase in capital required a special law, incurring fixed cost for the bank. However, Figure 6 shows that such limits were not reached until the late 1840's, meaning that the restriction was never binding between 1803 and 1833. Thus there must have been other forces that induced the bank to lend more to farmers and artisans.
Yet another plausible explanation is the passage of a chattel mortgage law in 1832. Discounts, even accommodation papers, were implicitly backed by personal and real properties in this period. However, the bank had to go through a litigation procedure after default to liquidate the debtor's asset. Moreover, the debtor might have multiple creditors, all of them making claims on the property of the debtor. Therefore banks may not be able recover the full amount owed by the borrower. Chattel mortgage provided a new means of collateral, especially for small loans. Like mortgage, the mortgagee (bank) had the first priority over the mortgaged item, creating more security in default. Bogue, Cannon, and Winkle (2003) demonstrated that chattel mortgages were important in Middle West agriculture as it provides farmers short-term financing.
Is chattel mortgage crucial for broadening the access to credit in Plymouth
County? In the sample of 681 discounts between 1844 and 1849, there were only 13 discounts with collateral. It was also difficult to tell what exactly was the collateral.
Objects used as collateral could be railroad stocks, banks stocks, or other personal properties. The small number of collateralized loans indicates that chattel mortgage could not explain the significant change in borrower's profile. Moreover, among the 13 collateralized loans, 9 of the borrowers could be identified of their occupation. 7 discounts went to merchants whereas the other two went to mariners. Thus the chattel mortgage law did not seem to make any difference, either.
Evidence on Credit Rationing
To examine the effect of new entrant, one must first establish the existence of an incumbent monopolist. In the case of banks in 19 th century America, the definition of monopolistic behavior was unique-under usury law, the "monopolist" could not set prices. However, they did have the advantage of information on borrowers. Debates on the validity of usury law abound; however, most focused on the possibility in the personal credit market, such as the dual prices of local storekeeper. Despite some small complications in calculating the annual interest rate, the standard discount rate was at 6%, that is, 1% for a 60-day discount. This number applied to virtually all discounts in the time span. Therefore, one has reason to believe that the usury law was indeed binding.
Under such restrictions, banks naturally would have to minimize the default rate to maximize profit. Another piece of evidence for credit rationing can be seen from the profitability figures of banks. If credit rationing indeed existed, the new entrant should be able to attract the excess demand for credit at the interest rate ceiling. In other words, there would be enough demand to support both the incumbent and the entrant. On the other hand, if the interest rate ceiling were at or close to the market-clearing rate, the new entrant would lower the interest rate and curtail the profitability of both banks.
Profitability also provides some insight into the issue. Despite new entrants, the Plymouth Bank continued to make profit. Moreover, its direct competitor, Old Colony Bank, was also profitable from the very beginning. Both banks paid out dividends consistently. The next question, however, why didn't Plymouth Banks simply provide more credit? Such possibility could be approached from two angles. The bank might have been able to use a higher leverage to lend more. However, this was constrained by the banking regulations of note issuing-any bank could only issue notes up to twice of its paid in capital. Thus in order to lend more, banks would need to expand their capital stock.
Although profitability figures provide preliminary evidence on credit rationing, there are a few caveats. First, one cannot know the counter-factual; Plymouth Bank could have made more profits were it not for the new entrant. Second, the profitability of the new entrant could also be due to cyclical factors. Figure 5 shows the net profit 20 of the two banks in Plymouth county. During the period under analysis, the capital stock remained the same for both banks ($100,000 each). Thus one only needs to look at the absolute level of profit and dividend. There was indeed a profitability surge around 1832, when the Old Colony Bank began its operation. However, for Plymouth Bank, the surge started before 1832. Figure 5 also shows the dividend for both banks. Overall, the profit of the banks fluctuated significantly over the latter period. Nevertheless the banks were able to distribute dividends at a fairly constant rate, with the exception of 1837. It shows that despite fluctuations, the banks were in general profitable.
Competition in the Credit Market-Impact of New Entry
Theoretically, the incumbent and the entrant could possibly take different strategies in attracting discounts. That is, they could pursue different markets. One could target the higher risk, the other could stay in the mature market. However, because of existing personal relationships and contemporary laws, this was obviously not the best choice. First, merchants formed both banks. With the information they possessed from daily transactions, each bank had a potentially low-risk client base. This existing information structure provided a perfect environment to price discriminate. However, the usury ceiling was still enforced, at least for banks. Judging from the bank discount rates, the interest rate ceiling was binding. Therefore neither bank could pursue a high-risk clientele by raising the interest rate.
Due to the lack of information on the lending profiles of Old Colony Bank, it is difficult to find out the exact extent to which the entrant eroded the clientele base of the Plymouth Bank. However, judging from the behavior of the petitioners, the Old Colony
Bank did have a group of merchants who were involved in the local credit market.
Moreover, they themselves also had demand for credit. One of the major borrowers from Plymouth Bank between 1825 and 1832, Bourne Spooner of Plymouth, did not appear once in the period of 1844 to 1849. From the census of 1850, he was 60 and living in Plymouth. Thus it would be unlikely that he had no need for credit. The most probable explanation was that one of the family members, James Spooner, petitioned for the Old Colony Bank. Thus Bourne Spooner had a more readily available source of credit. A few other names associated with the petitioners of the new bank also stopped discounting at Plymouth Bank. Judging from the census of 1850, they were still alive and working. This suggests that these people borrowed at the new bank.
Migrating from one bank to the other completely was not the only way to the entrant could take away to clients of the Plymouth Bank. Some borrowers discounted at both banks. George Drew, a merchant of Plymouth, discounted extensively at Plymouth
Bank between 1804 and 1832. His name also appeared in two entries in the later period.
In 1843, both the Plymouth Bank and Old Colony Bank, along with another individual, brought suit against him. This shows that he maintained credit relationships with both banks.
Looking at the amount of asset holdings of banks can also shed lights on the impact of new entrant. Figure 6 plots the "debts due to banks" for both Plymouth Bank and Old Colony Bank. One can see that between 1833 and 1835, the assets of Plymouth Bank dropped. This could very possibly be the effect of Old Colony Bank taking away the old customers. Although Old Colony Bank started its business in 1832, it is reasonable that it impact was most strongly felt only a while after its entry. This is because a large proportion of the discounts were renewed multiple times until it was finally paid off. Hence it took some time before one borrower completely transferred to one bank from another.
In any case, the entry of Old Colony Bank took away part of the reliable customer base at the Plymouth Bank. However, after a few years, Plymouth Bank was able to regain its profitability. Its assets (debt due to banks) went back to its original level around 1836 and 1837, only to take another hit during the crisis of 1837. In addition to the occupation breakdown, one can also look at the "concentration" of presenters of discounts. In order to make the proper comparison, I sampled the years 1825 to 1832 and the years 1844 to 1849. Between 1825 and 1832, 190 discounters discounted a total of 583 times, averaging 3.06 times per discounter. In the latter period, 277 discounters presented 674 discount, averaging 2.43 times. Moreover, despite fewer data points between 1825 and 1832, 13 discounters had more than 10 entries in the records. For the latter period, only 6 discounters had more than 10 entries. This suggests that by 1844, the body of borrowers were less concentrated than ever. This is also consistent with the hypothesis that people had access to bank credit. If Plymouth Bank only pursued existing borrowers, one would expect that in the aftermath of the 1837 crisis, those endured should be the long-term borrowers. Thus the borrowers should look less diverse.
The amount lent also provides evidence on the change in the borrowers of the banks. First of all, the average amount between 1804 and 1833 was $816.73, with the median of $500. In the latter period, the average amount was $496.64, with the median of $274.84. Both mean and median was much lower in the latter period than their counterpart in the earlier period. Moreover, despite some fluctuations in these two statistics from year to year, the basic feature remains stable: the amount lent was much lower in the latter period. To pursue this argument further, Table 13 lists the occupation distribution by quartiles of amount between 1844 and 1849. One can see the transition between small loans and large loans. Artisans and farmers had more small loans and merchants mainly borrowed greater amounts. This matches the conjecture that the farmers and artisans had access to small loans. Moreover, this also explains the large number of loans but relative low assets holding between 1844 and 1849. Plymouth Bank was shifting towards smaller loans.
Conclusions
Sylla (2002) 
